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Abstract
Recent years have seen a surge in the evidence on the impacts of active labor market programs
for numerous countries. However, little evidence has been presented on the effectiveness of such
programs in China. Recent economic reforms, associated massive lay-offs, and accompanying
public retraining programs make China fertile ground for rigorous impact evaluations. This study
evaluates retraining programs for laid-off workers in the cities of Shenyang and Wuhan using a
comparison group design. To our knowledge, this is the first evaluation of its kind in China. The
evidence suggests that retraining helped workers find jobs in Wuhan, but had little effect in
Shenyang. However, in terms of earnings impacts, retraining appears to have increased earnings
in Shenyang but not in Wuhan. The study raises questions about the overall effectiveness of
retraining expenditures, and it offers some directions for policymakers about future interventions
to help laid-off workers.
11. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, traditional job guarantees and economic security provided by urban
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China have been reduced as part of a nationwide economic
reform effort. To help workers transition to the free labor market, China instituted what was
called the xiagang system. Xiagang were redundant workers who remained attached to the SOE
and were provided subsistence income payments along with contributions to public health
insurance and pension funds, and often times housing. While the aim was to smooth labor
adjustment, many redundant workers have experienced significant income losses and had
difficulty finding new jobs. The xiagang system has been dismantled, and much restructuring has
already occurred. Still, even the most optimistic observers recognize that China faces more labor
adjustment challenges, especially with reforms called for by China’s accession to the World
Trade Organization (WTO). China, like virtually all countries—especially transition
countries—is increasingly facing difficult policy questions about how to address the problem of
laid-off workers in order to provide effective social protection and maintain social stability.
How well publicly provided training works can influence policy decisions in a range of
programs, including social security, unemployment insurance, and public employment services
designed to help workers find new jobs and restore their incomes. These latter interventions are
collectively known as active labor market programs (ALMPs) and include retraining programs,
employment services (e.g., labor exchange, counseling, etc.), job creation through loans or
subsidies, public service employment, public works, and self-employment assistance. Active
labor market programs such as these have been used extensively in developed and transition
economies for many years. They represent an attractive policy approach because they are
1See Heckman, Lalonde and Smith (1999) for a comprehensive review of impact evaluations in OECD
countries; Dar and Gill (1998) for a review of 11 studies covering the United States, Sweden, Australia, Canada, and
France; Galasso, Ravallion, and Salvia (2001) for a study on the Argentinian Proemplio experiment; Jimenez and
Kugler (1987) for a study on Columbia’s national in-service training systems; Fretwell, Benus, and O’Leary (1999)
for an evaluation of training programs in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic; and NEI (2001) for an evaluation
of training programs in Bulgaria.
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intended to provide jobless workers a “trampoline” for getting back into productive employment,
as opposed to simply providing them a financial “safety net.”
However, as international experience has clearly demonstrated, implementing an
effective active labor market policy poses many challenges. The immediate challenge is to
design and implement retraining and other ALMPs that actually benefit participants in a cost-
effective manner. Indeed, it is apparent from many studies in developed and transition countries
that this is very often not the case. For this reason, there is growing emphasis on scientifically
evaluating the effects and cost efficiency of these programs and basing future program
expenditures on such results.
In turn, this has led to a surge in the academic literature on impact evaluation of training
programs. While a large literature has now been established for developed countries, the
evidence for developing and transition economies is scarce.1 For China in particular, no evidence
is presently available. Given the extent of economic reforms in China over the past few decades,
combined with associated massive layoffs and accompanying public retraining programs, this is
paradoxical, as these events virtually cry out for rigorous evaluation of the impact of job
training.
This study evaluates retraining programs for laid-off workers in the Chinese cities of
Shenyang and Wuhan using a carefully designed comparison group methodology. To our
knowledge, this is the first evaluation of its kind in China. The results suggest that retraining
3helped workers find jobs in Wuhan but had little effect in Shenyang. When it comes to earnings,
on the other hand, retraining appears to increase earnings in Shenyang but not in Wuhan. The
study raises questions about the overall effectiveness of retraining expenditures and it offers
some directions for policymakers about future interventions to help laid-off workers. The
structure of the paper is as follows. The next section presents the institutional context and labor
market context of training for laid-off workers in China, focusing on the experiences of workers
in Shenyang and Wuhan. Section 3 provides a literature review, which is followed in section 4
by a discussion of the methodology underlying the analyses in this paper. Section 5 presents the
data and discusses the quasi-experimental design in detail. Results follow in section 6, while
section 7 concludes and provides suggestions for future research on the possible impact of active
labor market programs in China.
2. INSTITUTIONAL AND LABOR MARKET CONTEXT OF TRAINING
To understand the potential for job training, it is important to know the institutional
framework and labor market context of training for laid-off workers in China. We first discuss
national government policies promoting reemployment of laid-off workers, and then review the
economic conditions at the national and provincial levels. This is followed by a brief
examination of the economic conditions in the cities of Shenyang and Wuhan around the time
retraining programs there were evaluated.
2This section draws heavily on Rong (2002).
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2.1 Government Policies Promoting the Reemployment of Laid-Off Workers2
In May 1998, the Central Party Committee and the State Council jointly organized a
conference titled “Safeguarding the Basic Living Standards of Laid-off Workers in SOEs and
Their Reemployment.” After the conference, the Central Party Committee and the State Council
jointly issued an outline of various policy measures adopted. These included setting up
reemployment service centers (RSCs) and establishment of programs to promote the
reemployment of laid-off workers (see sidebar on p. 6, “Policies to Establish Reemployment
Centers in 1998”). Registration with an RSC established an institutional membership for the
jobless distinct from being either xiagang or openly unemployed.
Beginning in 2001, programs for laid-off workers started to change in Liaoning province,
of which Shenyang is the capital city, and in some other provinces piloting social security
reform. Wuhan, capital of Hubei province, was not among the cities where social security
reforms were tried. In the pilot cities, including Shenyang, no additional RSCs were created
starting in 2001, and newly laid-off workers unable to find new jobs joined the ranks of the
unemployed as soon as they were separated from their prior employers. Current RSC registrants,
retained their institutional affiliations during the pilot test period. In Wuhan, newly laid-off
workers were required to register with an RSC between 2001 and 2003, right up until the final
closure of all RSCs in 2003. By 2003, all workers who were registered with RSCs terminated
their membership and became unemployed unless they had found new jobs.
When RSCs were closed, a range of new active labor market policies (e.g., training, job
information, job referrals, career information, etc.) were adopted to strengthen labor market
5development. These were available at public labor bureaus not requiring compulsory registration
by the jobless. Table 2.1 shows the volume of job referrals for laid-off workers in Shenyang and
Wuhan. For example, in both cities, the government required that the labor bureau offer at least
three opportunities for employment for laid-off workers who demonstrated a great need. Special 
services in Wuhan were also targeted to households in which both husband and wife were laid
off and unemployed. Arrangements for publicly funded job training were handled differently.
Other policy measures included development of tertiary industries, particularly
community services; encouraging the development of small and medium enterprises; facilitating
self-employment, including credit support; and expediting social security reform particularly in
the areas of pensions, health care, and unemployment insurance. The contribution rate for
unemployment insurance was increased to 3 percent from 1 percent beginning in the latter half of
1999, with the 2-percentage-point increase shared equally between employers and employees.
In Wuhan, 40,000 laid-off workers were employed in community services by the end of
June 1998. By May 2001, in Shenyang there were over 600 grass-roots-level organizations
providing employment to about 90,800 laid-off workers. During the same period, the Shenyang
TABLE 2.1 JOB RECOMMENDATION ACTIVITIES FOR LAID-OFF WORKERS
1998 1999 2000
Shenyang City
Persons receiving job recommendations
Successful rate of job recommendation
Regular job fair (month)
Participants in regular job fairs (month)
70,000
40.2
12
800
81,000
40.8
23
800
89,000
40.8
30
1,200
Wuhan City
Persons receiving job recommendations
Successful rate of job recommendation
Regular job fair (month)
Participants in regular job fairs (month)
130,300
51.6
21
314
146,517
53.1
28
414
146,800
51.0
35
465
SOURCE: Shenyang Municipal Labor Bureau and Wuhan Municipal Labor Bureau.
6municipal government set up various markets employing over 170,000 workers. Additional local
efforts were also undertaken to encourage workers to set up businesses. These included tax
reductions and exemptions, a temporary reduction in municipal administrative fees, and credit
support.
2.2 Economic Conditions—National and Provincial
China’s GDP growth rates over the past few years have been enviable, but employment
growth rates were more modest. Urban employment has been growing, albeit at a slower rate in
recent years, while rural employment has declined significantly. However, provinces differ from
the national averages in GDP and employment growth rates, unemployment rates, and the
number of xiagang. Unemployment rates in both Liaoning and Hubei provinces have been higher
than the national average since 1996, even though their provincial GPD growth rates have
exceeded the national average since 1997 (Table 2.2). Despite the relatively high output growth,
employment has been falling in Liaoning and Hubei, with even larger reductions in their urban
areas in 1998 and 1999.
TABLE 2.2  GDP, EMPLOYMENT GROWTH RATES AND UNEMPLOYMENT RATES
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999
GDP growth rate National
Liaoning
Shenyang
Hubei
Wuhan
9.6
8.6
11.0
13.2
16.0
8.8
8.9
10.0
13.0
14.6
7.8
8.3
10.9
10.3
11.2
7.1
8.2
10.3
8.3
11.0
Employment growth rate National
Liaoning
Hubei
1.3
!0.2
!0.5
1.1
1.6
0.6
0.5
!11.9
!3.4
0.9
!1.2
!1.7
Urban employment growth rate National
Liaoning
Hubei
3.8
!0.7
0.3
2.0
!1.5
11.4
2.3
!22.5
!15.6
1.6
!3.1
!5.1
Unemployment rate National
Liaoning
Hubei
3.0
3.6
3.5
3.1
3.9
3.5
3.1
3.4
3.3
3.1
3.5
3.3
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China (2000a,b).
7Nationwide SOEs continued to be the dominant employer in 1999, with a 55 percent
share of all urban employment in 1999, with another 11 percent of the workforce was employed
in collective owned enterprises. By 1999 the private sector share of all urban employment
nationwide had risen to 22 percent. In the provinces of Liaoning and Hubei, a somewhat larger
share of total employment was in the private sector (see Table 2.3).
Regions vary in the share of the workforce who are xiagang, with the magnitude
dependent on the extent of the SOE reform and the industrial composition of employment. By
end-1999, laid-off workers in Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Hubei, and Hunan constituted 41 percent
of all layoffs nationwide, with Liaoning and Hubei accounting for 13 and 7 percent, respectively
(Table 2.4). As shares of the total employed nationwide, Liaoning and Hubei account for 3 and 4
percent, respectively, so these two provinces have disproportionately high shares of the nation’s
laid-off workers. In Liaoning and Hubei provinces, 57 and 59 percent of xiagang, respectively, 
were from SOE, while 38 and 29 percent, respectively, were from the urban collective-owned
enterprises. Nationally, 70 percent of xiagang workers were from the SOE, and 28 percent from
collectively-owned enterprises.
TABLE 2.3  URBAN EMPLOYMENT BY OWNERSHIP
Urban employment 1999
Total
employment
(millions)
Percentage employed in
SOE Collective
Other
ownership Private
National 210.14 55.0 11.0 11.8 22.2
Liaoning 8.575 52.2 13.3 9.9 24.6
Hubei 8.025 55.4 9.6 7.6 27.5
SOURCE: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China (2000b).
8Job layoffs are also concentrated in certain industries. Textiles, coal mining, armaments,
TABLE 2.4  LAID-OFF WORKERS BY REGIONS, 1999
Province
Total number of
laid-off workers
Percent of
national total
Total number of laid-off
workers in SOEs
Percent of national
total (in SOEs)
Northern Region
Beijing
Tianjin
Hebei
Shanxi
Inner Mongolia
31,800
201,341
264,961
260,035
131,289
0.3
2
3
3
1
29,000
144,763
196,799
200,554
129,189
0.5
2
3
3
2
Northeast Region
Liaoning
Jilin
Heilonjiang
1,189,913
466,455
1,217,700
13
5
13
678,000
339,685
740,500
11
5
12
Eastern Region
Shanghai
Jiangsu
Zhejiang
Anhui
Fujian
Jiangxi
Shandong
146,948
287,602
113,378
447,250
29,323
326,253
234,855
2
3
1
5
0.3
3
3
98,513
170,550
56,348
287,573
29,323
261,930
143,109
2
3
1
5
0.5
4
2
Central Region
Henan
Hubei
Hunan
Guandong
Guangxi
Hainan
422,725
700,301
758,320
298,680
134,815
43,497
5
7
8
3
1
0.5
262,657
414,514
524,522
135,184
127,616
38,933
4
7
8
2
2
1
Southwest Region
Chongqing
Sichuan
Guizhou
Yunnan
192,943
432,952
130,172
64,346
2
5
1
1
135,136
296,383
109,559
58,844
2
5
2
1
Northwest Region
Shannxi
Gansu
Qinghai
Ningxia
Xinjiang
435,983
173,994
61,958
43,475
94,063
5
2
1
0.5
1
324,946
156,917
61,090
39,526
87,485
5
2
1
1
1
SOURCE: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China (2000b).
3In 1999, laid-off workers in textile enterprises directly affiliated to the central government was 600,000,
400,000 in coal mining, 200,000 in armaments, and 200,000 in machinery enterprises. These figures are taken from
the presentation entitled “Situation of Laid-Off Workers in State Enterprise and Policies on Securing their Basic
Living Standards and Promoting their Re-employment,” by the Labor Bureau at the Labor Market Policies Seminar
in Beijing in May 1999.
4Survey Report on Employment Situation in Wuhan, 1997, mimeo. The statistics refer to 1996.
5Presentation by the Shenyang Municipal Labor Bureau on “Forcefully Implementing Re-employment
Project—Organizing and Facilitating Redundant Workers for Reemployment” at Labor Market Policies Seminar in
May 1999.
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and machinery are the harder hit industries.3 Table 2.5 shows the industrial distribution of laid-
off workers in SOEs in 1998 and 1999. The industrial classification is broad and shows that over
half the laid-off workers are from the manufacturing industry in Wuhan. Supplemental
information indicates that the manufacturing sectors impacted greatest by layoffs were textiles
and general machinery manufacturing. In certain categories of manufacturing—for example,
cultural, educational and sports products, leather, fur, and rubber manufacturing—the ratio of
laid-off workers to total workers was between 40 and 50 percent.4 Evidence for Shenyang
identifies four sectors with relatively high redundancies: light industry, textiles, petroleum, and
chemical and agricultural machinery.5
TABLE 2.5 DISTRIBUTION OF LAID-OFF WORKERS IN SOES, BY INDUSTRY, 1998–1999 (%)
National Liaoning Hubei
1998 1999 1998 1999 1998 1999
Coal enterprises 4.85 4.96 3.53 2.97 0.00 0.00
Metallurgical enterprises 1.34 1.26  1.02  0.98  1.06  1.15  
Nonferrous enterprises 1.27 1.17 1.47 1.64 0.44 0.02
Mining and Quarrying 11.65 11.96 7.54 9.12 4.99 5.00
Manufacturing enterprises 43.00 42.59 41.02 45.07 53.05 53.23
Electricity, gas, and water 1.98 2.03 0.64 0.58 1.84 1.84
Construction 7.49 8.38 5.46 6.17 7.66 7.69
Transportation, storage, postal and telecom. 4.70 4.35 1.31 1.89 6.02 6.04
Wholesale and retail trade, catering 16.21 15.14 36.13 28.59 14.60 14.66
Other enterprises 7.51 8.17 1.87 3.00 10.34 10.37
SOURCE: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China (2000b).
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When we examine employment growth rates across sectors (Table 2.6), we find that
between 1996 and 1999, while employment in the manufacturing and mining/quarrying sectors
declined significantly, employment in the financial services, real estate activities, and social
services rose. Employment in wholesale and retail trade grew between 1996 and 1998 but
contracted between 1998 and 1999.
Among laid-off workers registered with RSCs in 1999, about 47 percent were female in
both Wuhan and Shenyang, while the proportion female in the urban labor force was only 28 and
29 percent, respectively, in Hubei and Liaoning provinces. The vast majority of workers were
less than 46 years old and among the less educated, with most having attained no higher than a
junior middle school level (Table 2.7).
TABLE 2.6 EMPLOYMENT GROWTH RATES OF VARIOUS SECTORS, 1996–1998
Percentage
1996–1997
Percentage
1997–1998
Percentage
1998–1999
Agriculture/fishery 1 1 0
Mining/quarrying !4 !7 !17
Manufacturing !2 !3 !13
Utilities (electricity, gas, water) 4 1 0
Construction 1 3 !4
Geological prospecting, water conservancy 0 !4 !10
Transportation, storage, communications 2 1 !3
Wholesale and retail trade, restaurant 6 2 !3
Financial intermediation and insurances 5 4 2
Real estate activities 4 2 8
Social services 8 6 7
Healthcare, social welfare, and sporting 3 1 1
Education, culture and arts, radio, film, TV 3 0 1
Scientific research and polytechnical services 2 !3 !4
Government agencies, social organizations 0 0 0
Others 7 !3 5
SOURCE: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China (2000b).
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Table 2.8 indicates that laid-off workers in the Hubei RSCs are much more likely to be
paid all basic living expenses (88 percent) than those in Liaoning (59 percent). Nearly 16 percent
of Liaoning workers in the RSCs do not receive any basic living expenses, while only 4 percent
in Hubei go without basic support. About half of the laid-off workers in Hubei belonged to an
RSC for less than a year, with none staying more than two years. In Liaoning, about 37 percent
of the laidoff stayed with an RSC for less than a year, while 12 percent stayed for over two years.
2.3 Economic Conditions in Shenyang and Wuhan
Were economic conditions in Shenyang and Wuhan different? Wuhan had a more
dynamic economy than Shenyang. GDP per capita in 2000 in both cities was about the
same—16,111 yuan in Wuhan and 16,333 yuan in Shenyang. GDP growth rates have exceeded
TABLE 2.7  CHARACTERISTICS OF LAID-OFF WORKERS IN REEMPLOYMENT SERVICE CENTERS, 1999
Province
Total workers in
reemployment
center
Percentage distribution, by
educational attainment
Percentage
female
Percentage distribution, by age
Junior
middle
Secondary/
technical
College or
higher
# 35
years
35–45
years
$ 46
years
Liaoning 727,365 62.8 28.6 8.7 47.3 35.4 44.2 20.4
Hubei 587,950 54.5 40.5 5.0 47.3 33.5 48.1 18.4
SOURCE: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China (2000b).
TABLE 2.8  LAID-OFF WORKERS IN REEMPLOYMENT SERVICE CENTER — RECEIPT OF LIVING SUBSIDY AND
DURATION IN CENTER, 1999
Province
Total workers in
reemployment
service center
Percentage distribution, by status of
basic living expenses
Percentage distribution, by duration
in the reemployment service center
All living
expenses
paid
Not all living
expenses
paid
No living
expenses
paid < 1 year 1–2 years 2–3 years
Liaoning 727,365 58.5 25.6 15.9 36.7 50.9 12.4
Hubei 587,950 87.7 8.3 4.0 52.5 47.5 0.0
SOURCE: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China (2000b)
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10 percent annually in both cities over the period 1996–2000, though growth rates in Wuhan
have been higher. Wuhan’s growth exceeded that in Shenyang by 5–6 percent higher in
1996–1997 and 1–2 percent higher in 1998–2000 (Table 2.9). Higher growth rates provide
greater opportunities for creating jobs, but did the jobs actually materialize? Employment
elasticities show the responsiveness of employment to economic growth and are calculated by
dividing the net new job growth rate by the economic growth rate. The employment elasticity
13
TABLE 2.9 SHENYANG, WUHAN AND NATIONAL ECONOMY AND EMPLOYMENT CONDITION DATA
GDP (100 million yuan) 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Average
Shenyang
Wuhan
Whole country
764.4
782.1
66,850.5
851.1
912.3
73,142.7
938.8
1,001.9
76,967.2
1,013.2
1,085.7
80,579.4
1,119.1
1,206.8
88,189.6
1,066.15
1,146.25
84,384.5
GDP growth rate (%)
Shenyang
Wuhan
Whole country
11
16
9.8
10
14.6
8.6
10.9
11.2
7.8
10
11
7.2
10.3
12
8.3
10.44
12.96
8.34
Total revenue (100 million yuan) Total
Shenyang
Wuhan
Whole country
39.93
36.21
7,407.99
47.9
41.67
8,651.14
54.2
50.77
9,875.95
56.79
60.47
11,444.08
61.12
69.77
13,395.23
259.94
258.89
50,774.39
Total revenue growth rate (%) Average
Shenyang
Wuhan
Whole country
12.26
21.38
18.7
19.96
18.08
16.8
13.15
17.14
14.2
4.78
12.16
15.9
7.62
12.39
17
11.55
16.23
16.52
Total exports (US$ 100 million) Total
Shenyang
Wuhan
Whole country
8.67
8.04
1,510.5
8.53
9.41
1,827.9
7.75
10.82
1,837.1
7.99
4.83
1,949.3
12.97
6.49
2,492
45.91
39.59
9,616.8
Total amount of foreign capital actually used (US$ 100 million) Total
Shenyang
Wuhan
Whole country
7.87
9.2
548.04
8.68
9.31
644.08
10.21
10.56
585.57
10.35
11.66
526.59
10.44
13.03
593.56
47.55
53.76
2,897.84
General retail price index (preceding year = 100)
Shenyang
Wuhan
Whole country
106
106
106.1
101.7
100.7
100.8
96.5
96.2
97.4
95.4
93.7
97
98
97.4
98.5
General consumer price index (preceding year = 100)
Shenyang
Wuhan
Whole country
107.9
112.2
108.3
105.1
103.1
102.8
99
97.4
99.2
97.6
96.1
98.6
100.1
100.6
100.4
Primary industry employed persons (10,000 persons) Average rate (%)
Shenyang
Wuhan
Whole country
74.2
91.4
34,769
78.2
93
34,730
82.7
92.8
34,838
87.7
92.9
35,364
88.7
91.4
35.575
5.71
!0.47
0.06
Second industry employed persons (10,000 persons)
Average growth
rate (%)
Shenyang
Wuhan
Whole country
161.6
154.6
16,180
152.1
154.2
16,459
144.3
152.3
16,440
136.3
151.9
16,235
133.5
148.9
16,009
!4.11
!0.27
0.49
Table 2.9 (Continued)
GDP (100 million yuan) 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Average
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Tertiary industry employed persons (10,000 persons)
Average growth
rate (%)
Shenyang
Wuhan
Whole country
148
16.4
17,901
155.6
164.6
18,375
152.6
170.1
18,679
154.6
172.9
18,987
156
177.4
19,566
2.07
3.03
3.22
Total number of employment persons (10,000 persons)
Average growth
rate (%)
Shenyang
Wuhan
Whole country
383.7
406.4
68,850
385.7
411.8
69,600
379.5
415.2
69,957
377.3
417.8
70,586
378.2
417.8
71,150
0.46
0.96
0.94
Total population (10,000 persons)
Average growth
rate (%)
Shenyang
Wuhan
Whole country
671
715.9
122,389
937.8
723.9
123,626
674.8
931.8
124,810
677
740.2
125,909
685.1
749.2
126,583
0.55
1.1
0.9
Taxes (100 million yuan)
Average growth
rate (%)
Shenyang
Wuhan
Whole country
35.07
28.43
6,909.82
39.95
32.58
8,234.04
40.99
37.71
9,262.8
51.61
39.84
10,682.58
56.33
44.77
12,581.51
12.9
17.8
21.7
Self-employment Individual (10,000 persons)
Average growth
rate (%)
Shenyang
Wuhan
Whole country
21
40.48
1,709
23
45.76
1,919
30.6
51.49
2,259
52.7
54.15
2,414
56.4
63.61
2,136
16.39
13,94
7.38
Employment elasticity Average
Shenyang
Wuhan
Whole country
0.125
0.122
0.136
0.052
0.091
0.127
!0.147
0.074
0.066
!0.058
0.057
0.125
0.023
0
0.096
!0.001
0.069
0.11
SOURCE: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China (2001), Shenyang Yearbook (2001), and
Wuhan Statistical Yearbook (2001).
was higher in Wuhan than in Shenyang. Between 1996 and 2000, Shenyang’s employment
elasticity was !0.001, while Wuhan’s employment elasticity was 0.069. Thus, despite growth
rates exceeding 10 percent annually over this period, Shenyang did not experience net new job
creation. Over this five-year period, while growth rates were high in both cities, Wuhan
succeeded in creating significantly more jobs than Shenyang.
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The employment structure across primary, secondary, and tertiary industries in both cities
was similar in 1999, with about 36 percent employed in the secondary industry, around 41
percent in the tertiary sector, and the remainder in the primary sector. However, the pattern of
employment growth differed by city over the period 1996–2000. From 1996 to 2000, the growth
rate of employment in the primary industry was negative in Wuhan while it was positive (5.7
percent) in Shenyang. In both Shenyang and Wuhan, employment in the secondary industry
declined—it declined by an average of 0.27 percent annually in Wuhan between 1996 and 2000,
while in Shenyang the decline was more substantial, at 4.1 percent annually. The tertiary
industry was the engine of employment growth in both cities. Employment growth over the
1996–2000 period averaged 3.03 percent annually in Wuhan and 2.07 percent in Shenyang. The
higher growth rate in the tertiary industry provided better employment opportunities in Wuhan.
Wuhan also enjoys better connections to the rest of China, with better developed rail and
communications systems that offer more opportunities for developing trade and commerce. The
tourism sector is also better developed in Wuhan, providing an important impetus for self-
employment. Wuhan has also invested significantly more than Shenyang in fixed assets. In 2000,
Wuhan spent 46.2 billion yuan (or 6,166 yuan per capita) on investments in fixed assets,
compared to 26.2 billion yuan (or 3,824 yuan per capita) in Shenyang. Foreign investment in
2000 in Wuhan (US$ 1.3 billion) also exceeded that in Shenyang (US$ 1.04 billion).
The average annual disposable income of urban residents in 2000 in Wuhan was 6,763
yuan, while it was only 5,850 yuan in Shenyang. However, despite lower incomes, Shenyang
residents saved more in the aggregate than Wuhan residents. The differences in savings rates
indicate either a scarcity of investment opportunities or reduced consumer confidence leading to
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lower spending. These savings represent a resource that could help create jobs given the right
incentives. Individually owned businesses saw strong growth in both Wuhan and Shenyang over
this period, though overall development was stronger in Wuhan.
3. METHODOLOGY
This section presents our methodology. First we discuss the economic theory underlying
the analyses, and then we discuss the empirical strategy.
3.1 Economic Model
The theoretical framework for this paper is standard human capital theory, according to
which an individual builds up knowledge and skills through education, experience and training
(formal and/or on-the-job) and subsequently gets rewarded in the labor market in terms of wages
(Becker 1964; Mincer 1974). This leads to the following simple model:
(3.1) ( ), , , ,i i i i iY Y S E T O=
where Y is the outcome for individual i (employment or wages), S is schooling, E is experience,
T is training, and O is other individual characteristics, for example gender, for individual i.
Schooling and experience are thought to affect employment prospects and wages positively,
since these factors positively affect the marginal product of an individual’s labor services.
Training may or may not affect employment prospects and/or wages positively. This depends on,
for example, whether the training in question is perceived by prospective employers to affect
workers’ productivity positively. If the training is thought to be of low quality or to be given to
workers of low quality, thereby acting as a negative “signal” to prospective employers (Spence
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1973), training might have no effect on employment and/or earnings and may even stigmatize
trainees.
3.2 Estimation Strategy
Rigorous evaluations of social programs, such as training, are necessary to determine
whether a program achieves its intended objectives. The central design issue in the evaluation is
constructing a proper counterfactual. That is, what would have happened in the absence of the
program? In the case of a training program, the evaluation must attempt to assess the
employment outcomes of participants against what would have been the outcomes if they had
not participated in the programs. The counterfactual is approximated by the experiences of a
“comparison group” of workers who are similar in all respects except program participation.
Programs that are evaluated on the basis of techniques that do not use a comparison group,
relying only on statistics of program participants alone (e.g., employment rate of graduates), are
of little use in determining whether programs are achieving their intended impacts.
Lacking a field experiment involving random assignment, our approach is based on a
quasi-experimental design, whereby participant and comparison groups are selected after the
program has commenced (we discuss this process in detail in the next section). Differences in the
characteristics of the participant and comparison groups are controlled for through statistical
techniques. To learn if results are robust to the choice of estimator, several techniques are used to
adjust for differences in observable characteristics of workers when estimating the empirical
counterpart of equation (3.1). First, we estimate the effect of training as simply the coefficient
for $1 in the regression
(3.2) 1 0 1 ,i iy T other controls= β + β + + ε
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where y1 is the outcome for individual i (employment or earnings), Ti is a binary indicator for
whether individual i received training or not, “other controls” include additional controls—such
as age (to proxy potential general experience), gender, and education—to ensure that the impact
estimate (i.e., the estimate of $1) is valid. gi is an error term that takes into account measurement
error on the dependent variable yi and other (unobserved) factors that may affect the dependent
variable yi. Equation (3.2), therefore, effectively is the empirical counterpart of equation (3.1).
We estimate (3.2) by ordinary least squares for the earnings outcome and as a probit for the
employment outcome. Additionally, to provide a robust alternative to the probit estimation, we
estimate the employment regression by ordinary least squares, as well, thereby effectively
estimating (3.2) as a linear probability model.
As yet another alternative, we apply propensity score matching methods. The intuition
behind this method is to compare the mean values of outcomes across the participant and
comparison groups. The comparison group is constructed in this case by a two-stage approach,
where participants and nonparticipants first are pooled and a regression of the determinants of
participation is performed. Based on this, the individuals are ranked across to their predicted
probability of participation in the program, i.e., their (predicted) “propensity score.” When a
participant and a nonparticipant are “close” in terms of their propensity score, we have a match.
This procedure is carried out for the entire sample, and the impact estimate—which corresponds
to the estimate of $1 in (3.2) from the regression case—is then calculated as the difference in
means on outcomes between matched participants and nonparticipants. There are several
different ways to do the matching, such as “nearest neighbor,” where the match is based on only
the closest nonparticipant, “k-nearest neighbors” matching, where the match is based on a
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weighted average of the k-nearest matches of nonparticipants in terms of their propensity scores,
as well as kernel-based and other methods (for details on propensity score matching see
Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983, 1984, 1985; Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1997, 1998; Dehejia
and Wahba 1999, 2002).
A potential issue that may affect all of the estimation methods is selection bias due to
unobservables. For example, training participation may be associated with a negative signal,
which could lead to omitted variables bias even in the case where participation in training is not
influenced by unobservables. This would be the case, for example, if employers think that
training participants are mostly the less able and unmotivated workers. A widely used method to
address this issue is to use instrumental variable techniques (IV, or two-stage least squares).
However, since we do not have an instrument in our dataset readily available, which affects
selection into programs without at the same time affecting the outcome(s) of interest
(employment and/or earnings), we cannot apply these methods. As a result, we must treat all
observables, including training, as predetermined.
4. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSES
This section discusses the data and survey methodology, and also provides descriptive
statistics on the samples for analysis. Tests for homogeneity in observable characteristics
between the participant and comparison groups are presented. Additionally, the nature of training
is discussed.
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4.1 Selection of Comparison and Training-Participant Groups
The objective was to do a rigorous evaluation of training provided to xiagang. Since there
was no intent to evaluate training when the program began, the evaluation was designed expost
and had to rely on the available information. The next several paragraphs summarize how our
data was gathered; details of our sampling are in Bidani et al. (2004, section 1 of Annex 1).
We received a list from the Shenyang Labor Bureau of 120,000 laid-off workers. This list
was derived from a census of SOEs and a list of workers who were laid off in the weeks and
months before July 1998. Both sources were regarded as reliable and complete. The SOE census
sampling procedure stratified city districts and then enterprises. We confined our sampling to the
Shenyang districts Dadong, Tiexi, and Heping to facilitate survey work for our counterparts.
Dadong and Tiexi have the largest concentration of laid-off workers from SOEs. Five enterprises
from each of six industries—textile, construction, metallurgy, petrol and chemical, light industry,
and machinery—were selected with probability proportional to size (i.e., each enterprise
selection was linked to the number of laid-off workers and was drawn without replacement).
Then a sample of 3,461 workers was randomly selected from the list. The number drawn was set
to compensate for the expectation that contact information would not be complete for a sizeable
share of persons.
The training sample in Shenyang was selected from the training registers of the Dadong
District Skilled Workers School, the Tiexi District Skilled Workers School, and the Heping
District Skilled Workers School. The training conducted in Shenyang was almost uniformly one
month in duration (132 hours of classroom training). All those who completed their training
during August–September 1998 were included in the master training list from which our
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participant sample was drawn. Only workers with complete addresses were included, and
workers with multiple training were included only once. Thus, the final participant sample
included 1,652 workers.
The comparison group in Wuhan was based on a similar census to the one in Shenyang,
but it was believed to be less complete. The census was done in July, August, and September of
1998 and represented the stock of workers who were laid off by that time. The list of laid-off
workers was computerized, and 2,118 were randomly selected from these files.
Instead of compiling the training sample from the training institutions directly as in
Shenyang, we received the master list of trainees from the Wuhan Labor Bureau. The training
sample in Wuhan was more diverse. The location or sponsors of training programs included the
Labor Bureau, employment and training centers at the city and district levels, skilled workers
schools, sector training centers, and other training institutions. The duration of training ranged
from one to six months. To get an adequate sample, we included those trained between July and
December 1998. A final sample of 1,666 workers was randomly selected after deleting those
who participated in multiple training and keeping only those with contact information.
4.2 The Final Sample
The World Bank evaluation project team prepared a draft questionnaire which was
revised by our counterparts in the Institute of Labor Studies (final questionnaire is provided in
Annex 4 of Bidani et al., 2004). The team from the Institute of Labor Studies was responsible for
implementing the data collection. Fielding of the survey began toward the end of May 2000 and
was completed the following month. Successful interview rates were highest for the Shenyang
participant group (61 percent), and lowest for the Shenyang comparison group (48 percent).
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Wuhan’s response rates were 51 percent for the participant group and 55 percent for the
comparison group. The survey teams indicated that inaccurate contact information was the
primary cause of nonresponse. The addresses on the identity cards of workers differed from their
actual residences in many cases.
The original lists have some basic demographic information (age, gender, and education)
for the comparison group and the training samples. We compared the samples of those
interviewed with those who were not interviewed to check for evidence of a significant bias due
to nonresponse and noncontact.
The sample in Shenyang that was actually interviewed was statistically significantly
different on the basis of age, gender, and education from the sample that could not be contacted.
The interviewed sample was a year older, significantly more female, and better educated. The
interviewed sample in Wuhan differed significantly from the noninterviewed only in terms of
age. The interviewed sample was a year older than the noninterviewed sample.
4.3 Generating Samples for Analysis
Betcherman, Dar, and Blunch (2002) discovered and discussed two anomalies related to
this dataset.  First, a substantial fraction of workers report working in July 1998, when then were
assumed to have been xiagang. This is addressed by deleting these workers to yield a “true”
xiagang only sample. Second, the dataset contain “late xiagangers,” that is, individuals reporting
having become xiagang after July 1998. These persons therefore were employed immediately
prior to the intervention and were still in their old firms. This second group was also deleted
from the sample for analysis since they too were not “true” xiagang. Another contamination
issue was that some individuals in the comparison group reported having received training. Since
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these more appropriately belong in the participant group, they were reassigned (see Bidani et al.
2004 for details).
4.4 Are the Comparison and Participant Groups Different?
In assessing whether the comparison and participant groups are different, we will focus
on the means from the employment regression samples (see Table A.1). We find that significant
differences between the comparison and participant groups exist in terms of the demographic
variables occupation, industry, and other firm characteristics (firm type, firm size) from which
the workers were laidoff in both cities. The differences are more pronounced in Shenyang than in
Wuhan. Training participants in both cities were more likely to be female and younger.
Participants in Shenyang were less likely to be married but more likely to have a high
educational attainment than the comparison group members. Such differences were not observed
to the same extent in the Wuhan sample. The occupational structure of the participant and
comparison groups was more similar in Wuhan. In Shenyang, the occupational structure differed
more significantly, with a higher share of the participant group in the professional, clerical, and
services categories, and a lower percentage of tem in the craft and machine operators. Thus, it
would be misleading to use unadjusted means to compute impacts of the training program. We
will therefore adopt methodologies that would allow us to control for observable differences
when computing the program impacts.
4.5 Nature of Training
In 1998, there were 113 schools to train skilled workers and 199 enterprise-based training
units in Shenyang. The municipal government launched an ambitious training plan that year,
allocating 10 million yuan to provide free training to all laid-off workers.  The city’s
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reemployment training center administered the program, which was implemented by training
organizations under the district labor bureaus. In Shenyang, the allocation of funding prior to
training had recently been replaced by an after-training expense reimbursement contingent on
training results. Training expenses were reimbursed in full for training programs with attendance
rates over 80 percent, a passing rate over 90 percent, and a reemployment rate over 70 percent.
When the reemployment rate fell below the required level, a 10 percent deduction was made in
the reimbursement for every 10 percent difference. Training institutions could be disqualified if
they did not meet the performance standards set.
In Wuhan, the government’s role in retraining of laid-off workers was less active. In
1998, there were 32 job skills schools and employment training centers within the labor system.
The city’s labor bureau administered the city’s reemployment training program for laid-off
workers and unemployed persons. The training was conducted by the labor bureau training
organizations (such as the city employment training center and district employment training
centers). Other organizations that satisfied the qualification requirements also undertook this
training for which they were compensated to cover part of their expenses.
Training programs in Shenyang were conducted on a significantly larger scale (Table
4.1). Between 1998 and 2000, 279,000 workers trained in contrast to around 64,000 workers in
Wuhan. Shenyang offered its workers a larger menu of training courses: 59 courses in 1999
compared to 34 different courses in Wuhan. The gross reemployment rates according to
administrative data, were in the 60–70 percent range for both cities, increasing steadily in Wuhan
over the three-year period.
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Nearly all training in Shenyang was one-month duration with 132 hours of study. In
Wuhan, training lasted between one and six months, with the usual duration 2–3 months of full
time study. Between July and December, 1998, the average number of course hours was 255
hours, of which 55 percent were practical. In Shenyang, training courses with a minimum
duration of one month were eligible for the government subsidy of 100 yuan per trainee. Laid-off
workers did not contribute to the training courses. However, in Wuhan, only courses of two to
three months were eligible for the government subsidy, and government policy was to provide
50–100 yuan from the reemployment fund for every laid-off worker trained and 300–400 yuan
for every unemployed worker trained. Trainees in Wuhan were charged part of the training
costs—they were exempt from paying the training fees but were expected to purchase textbooks
and practice materials. Most trainees contributed about 200 yuan to the cost of their training.
Despite the more ambitious xiagang training program by the Shenyang government, the
quality of programs varied widely across training institutions. Training institutions differed
greatly in capacity, space, classroom setup, workshop facilities, and laboratory and mechanical
equipment. A number of training institutions only provided theoretical instruction without any
TABLE 4.1  TRAINING ACTIVITIES FOR LAID-OFF WORKERS IN SHENYANG AND WUHAN
1998 1999 2000
Shenyang:
   Number of persons trained
   Number of training courses
   Reemployment rate after training
82,000
59
61
132,000
59
70
65,000
51
65
Wuhan:
   Number of persons trained
   Number of training courses
   Reemployment rate after training
13,304
32
60
23,317
34
65
27,343
36
70
SOURCE: Shenyang Municipal Labor Bureau and Wuhan Municipal Labor Bureau.
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practical training in their vocational courses. Some of the training courses did not provide skills
demanded in the local labor market, and there were not even minimal standards governing the
content of curricula and the qualifications of instructors.
The survey also asks about the nature of training. Table 4.2 shows information on the
training provider, the duration of training, the type of training, and whether individuals paid for
training. Training was different across the two cities. As indicated, we restricted our list to three
district training schools run by the labor bureau in Shenyang. So, the training there was almost
exclusively provided by the labor bureau. In contrast, training in Wuhan was more varied. About
three quarters was provided by the labor bureau, with the rest provided by other organizations.
The training in Shenyang was substantially shorter than that in Wuhan, averaging about one per
month, while the average duration of training in Wuhan is two to three months. Only about 3
percent of the participants in Shenyang paid all or part of the costs of training, whereas about 21
percent of participants paid at least part of the cost in Wuhan. The training organizations in
TABLE 4.2  CHARACTERISTICS OF TRAINING (%)
Shenyang Wuhan
Training location
Labor bureau
Other
0.956
0.044
0.716
0.284
Duration (months) 1.074 1.892
Type of training
Computers
Driving
Repair
Management, accounting, etc.
Cooking
Sewing and toymaking
Beauty, massage, and haircutting
Other
0.363
0.015
0.057
0.069
0.293
0.1658
0.193
0.051
0.325
0.105
0.086
0.284
0.088
0.014
0.023
0.133
Financing of training
Paid for training
Did not pay for training
0.028
0.972
0.212
0.788
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Wuhan included colleges, universities, and secondary technical schools, with presumably better
ability to deliver quality training.
There were also variations in the types of courses that the participants attended. In
Shenyang, about 37 percent of the sample took computer courses, 29 percent cooking, 19 percent
beauty, massage, and hair cutting, and another 17 percent sewing and toymaking. In Wuhan
about 33 percent took computer courses, 28 percent took management courses, 9 percent
cooking, 9 percent repairs, and 11 percent driving. There is some evidence that the types of
training courses conducted in Wuhan, especially those run by the private sector, were selected by
the organizers to accommodate the labor market demand for certain skills.
5. RESULTS
Our analyses focus on two key outcomes: current employment and earnings. We use
various estimators in this study to examine impacts of training on reemployment prospects and
earnings in the new employment among xiagang workers. Additionally, we also examine more
closely the determinants of training, as well as provide sensitivity analyses for different
specifications of explanatory variables.
5.1 Impact of Training on Employment and Earnings
Table 5.1 presents impact estimates for training computed by several different estimators:
OLS/linear probability model, probit, and four different propensity score matching estimators.
Training has a significantly positive impact on the likelihood of finding employment in Wuhan,
but no significant effect on employment in Shenyang. Specifically, the numerical estimate for
Shenyang is nil, but an employment rate gain of 9 to 12 percentage points was estimated for 
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training in Wuhan by OLS and probit, respectively. When we examine earnings at current jobs,
training appears to play only a positive role in Shenyang with estimates of the impact ranging
from 10 to 20 percent, but to have no effect in Wuhan. The impact estimates are robust across
the different estimators in both cities.
One problem with the propensity score matching methods is that they use markedly fewer
observations than the regression approaches (see bottom of Table 5.1). This reflects the fact that
the overlapping areas between the distributions of participants and comparison group
TABLE 5.1  TRAINING IMPACT ESTIMATE FROM A SERIES OF ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATORS
(Standard Errorsa in Parentheses)
Estimator
Employment Earnings
Shenyang Wuhan Shenyang Wuhan
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 0.013
[0.022]
0.090***
[0.027]
0.095*
[0.049]
!0.078
[0.062]
Probit, marginal effect 0.019
[0.032]
0.119***
[0.034]
NA NA
Propensity score matching
(1) Nearest neighbor matching 0.032
[0.047]
0.087*
[0.049]
0.207*
[0.109]
!0.017
[0.076]
(2) Five nearest neighbors matching !0.001
[0.040]
0.066*
[0.037]
0.160*
[0.085]
!0.057
[0.069]
(3) Kernel matching !0.005
[0.032]
0.080**
[0.032]
0.162**
[0.077]
!0.032
[0.061]
(4) Local Linear Regression matching !0.001
[0.034]
0.084**
[0.033]
0.159**
[0.071]
!0.028
[0.063]
(Max) Observationsb 1,821 1,278 929 592
NOTE: The first figure in the table is the coefficient, the second (in brackets) is the standard error. * Statistically
significant at 10%; ** Statistically significant at 5%; *** Statistically significant at 1%. Kernels used are as
follows: (3) epanechnikov kernel, (4) tricube kernel. For the propensity score matching estimators common support
is imposed by excluding participant observations whose propensity score is higher than the maximum or less than
the minimum propensity score of the comparison group. For the probit regression for Wuhan, one observation is
dropped from the estimation due to “Firmtype, other” being a perfect predictor for employment. For the propensity
score matching estimations, to impose common support,observations outside the region of common support are
dropped from the estimations in amounts as follows: Employment: 39 (Shenyang), 9 (Wuhan); Earnings: 36
(Shenyang), 11 (Wuhan).
     a Standard errors for the OLS and probit training impact estimates are robust, i.e. allowing for heteroscedasticity
of unknown form (Huber 1967; White 1980), while the standard errors for the propensity score impact estimates are
bootstrapped, using 200 replications.
     b To impose common support, the propensity score methods exclude extreme (in terms of their propensity score)
observations. See the note to Table 5.1 for details.
6To conserve space, the results discussed here and in the remainder of this section are not reported here. The
full set of results are included in an extended version of this paper than can be downloaded from www.niels-hugo.dk.
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observations, the so-called “region of common support,” is limited. This problem enhances the
appeal of the more traditional regression based methods (OLS and probit), where all
observations are retained in the calculation of the training impact estimates.
Since the regression estimates are similar across the different estimators, and more
completely use our sample information, OLS is our preferred estimator. Our sensitivity analysis
therefore relies on the OLS estimates.
5.2 Determinants of Participation in Training
While the impact estimates and their magnitudes clearly are of interest to policymakers,
there are other aspects of the programs that would potentially be relevant for policy regarding the
design of future training programs in China. In particular, it would be interesting to examine a bit
more closely who actually participates in the training, in other words, “who actually picks up the
training offered to prospective participants?”6 This amounts to examining the results from the
“first stage” of the propensity score matching estimations.
Among the main findings are that training program participants are predominantly
younger females who have visited an employment service center at some point. Also, workers in
industries other than manufacturing (the reference category) are more likely to participate in
training. For workers’ occupation prior to becoming xiagang there are no strong results.
However, workers who previously worked in SOEs (the reference category) are less likely to
have participated in training. Workers who currently receive unemployment benefits are more
likely to participate in training than are workers who do not receive unemployment benefits. In
Shenyang, workers from households with more employed workers are more likely to receive
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training than other workers. For all samples except the employment sample for Wuhan, workers
who were working in July 1998 are less likely to have participated in training than those who did
not work in July 1998.
Based on the previous discussion, there appears to be mixed evidence on the targeting of
the training programs in Shenyang and Wuhan. Workers who were working in July 1998, that is,
immediately prior to the intervention, are less likely to participate in training, while workers
collecting unemployment benefits are more likely to participate in training, indicating effective
targeting of the training programs in Shenyang and Wuhan in terms of labor market status.  
However, in Shenyang, workers from households with more working members are more likely to
participate in the training program, which seems to indicate poor targeting toward those most in
need. 
5.3 Determinants of Employability and Earnings beyond Training
It will also be interesting to shed additional light on determinants of employment and
earnings other than training. In evaluating the effectiveness of the program—which is the
primary objective of this paper—explanatory variables other than the training (participant)
indicator were included mainly to reduce the overall variance of the estimator and increase the
reliability of the inferences from estimated coefficients. In particular, to the extent that impacts
from other factors are confounded within the training indicator variable, those factors should be
controlled for in estimation. For example, it is possible that the participation in the program is
related to gender, education, or other factors. However, even if the primary role of explanatory
variables other than the training (participant) variable are to serve as controls, the results for the
estimated parameters of these variables are interesting in their own right. In particular, it will be
7This is arguably endogenous but needs to be controlled for, since such a relatively large fraction of the
sample was employed at the time of the intervention, although the entire sample was supposed to be xiagang at the
time of the intervention (Betcherman, Dar, and Blunch 2002).
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instructive for policy to know how other factors, such as gender, education, previous occupation,
and so on affect the labor market prospects of laid-off workers in China. After having completed
a review of the core evaluation results, we now examine results on the secondary variables.
First, females and disabled workers are both consistently much less likely to be employed
in both Wuhan and Shenyang. This should be an issue of concern for policymakers, particularly
if equity is considered important, but also since these two groups could potentially contribute
significantly to their households’ livelihoods. Second, there are strong positive education effects
from tertiary education for both employment and earnings in Wuhan, and for earnings in
Shenyang. Since job training works for those more prepared to benefit from it, more effort
should focus on identifying ways to help those with less formal education prepare for success in
the job market. In Shenyang, workers from households with more employed household members
are also more likely to be employed themselves, which might be due to spill-over effects or
social networks. In Wuhan, the time since becoming xiagang has a negative impact on being
employed; that is, the longer one is unemployed, the less likely he will find employment.
5.4 Robustness Checks
One possible concern with the previous results is that some of the explanatory variables
are potentially endogenous. To examine this issue a bit more, we estimate some disaggregated
specifications for the employment and earnings equations—for a total of five models. Starting
off with a core specification, which includes variables for training and employment status in July
19987 and the minimum set of variables, which can be justified as being exogenous: age and age
squared (to capture potential general experience), gender and disability status, we include
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additional (potentially endogenous) variables, until we end up with the final models, where the
full set of explanatory variables has been included. Model two adds education, while model three
additionally adds whether training was paid for, and whether the worker receives unemployment
insurance and benefits from the (xiagang) enterprise. Model four adds the characteristics of the
xiagang enterprise and occupation, including industry, usual earnings, and tenure in the xiagang
enterprise, while model five contains the full set of covariates, additionally including marital
status, houseownership status, and family composition variables.
While we have tried building up the models so that we start with a minimal, core
specification, which may be justified as being exogenous, and adding more and more potentially
endogenous variables to end up with the final, potentially “most endogenous” model, the choice
of which variables to include in the different specifications is somewhat arbitrary. The main
point, however, and the main result for this exercise, is that the impact estimate on the training
variables essentially is robust across the different specifications, especially for the training
regressions. For the earnings regressions, there are some differences between the different
specifications. For example, the earnings impact estimate becomes statistically significant
(negative) for specifications four and five for Wuhan, while the disaggregated analyses reveal
that only the impact estimate for the fifth model for Shenyang is statistically significant
(positive). For the other specifications, the impact estimates are still of the same magnitude—it is
just that the estimates are imprecisely measured.
Does the potential endogeniety of some regressors raise concerns about our results?
Insofar as we are interested in the impact on employment and earnings outcomes of the other
explanatory variables besides training, the answer appears to be “yes.” As far as the results from
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the propensity score matching methods regarding the training impact estimate are concerned,
however, this should pose much less of a problem. This is because the main guiding principle of
selecting the explanatory variables for the first stage (training determinants) regression is to
choose variables that are considered to be important determinants of the training decision—that
is, variables that are useful in predicting participant status, conditional on the “ignorability of
treatment” condition (Rubin 1978). This states that conditional on the observed covariates, the
selection into participant status should be independent of unobservables, which affect the
outcome variable(s) of interest (here, employment and earnings). While this condition clearly is
restrictive, propensity score matching still is quite useful, since it helps mitigate bias related to
observables: “In the matching approach, the influence of confounding variables is reduced by the
method of covariate balance, i.e., by matching the potentially confounding covariates of the
cases that participated with cases that did not. A perfect matching (whether on the individual
covariates or on the propensity score) eliminates any relationship between the covariates and
assignment to participation, and hence eliminates the possibility of bias from these variables”
(DiPrete and Gangl 2004, p. 4).
6. CONCLUSION
This paper presents results of an evaluation of retraining programs for laid-off workers in
Shenyang and Wuhan. To our knowledge, this is the first evaluation of its kind in China.
Training programs were estimated to have opposite employment and earnings impacts in the two
cities. In Shenyang, workers who had taken training in 1998 are no more likely to be employed
in mid-2000 than workers who had not participated in training programs. While in Wuhan,
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participation in training was estimated to have raised the probability of employment relative to
the comparison group. The pattern of impacts on earnings was the reverse. In Shenyang, training
has a substantial positive effect on the earnings of those employed at the time of the survey,
while in Wuhan there is no effect. These results are robust across alternative estimation methods.
Analyses of training determinants indicate mixed evidence on the targeting of the training
programs in Shenyang and Wuhan. On one hand, workers who were working in July 1998—that
is, immediately prior to the intervention—were less likely to participate in training, while
workers collecting unemployment benefits (and therefore, presumably are unemployed) were
more likely to participate in training, indicating effective targeting of the training programs in
terms of labor market status (presumably it would be difficult to both work and participate in the
program). On the other hand, at least in Shenyang, workers from households with more working
household members are more likely to participate in the training program, which suggests poor
targeting, at least as measured by the presence of other earners in the household.
While this evaluation must be supported by further research, it does raise a number of
issues regarding training policies for laid-off workers. Most obviously, the study suggests that
policymakers must adopt a critical approach to retraining and recognize that expectations hould
be moderate. Unless training programs are carefully designed and targeted, there are no
guarantees that impacts will be positive. This finding is consistent with the international
experience.
The different results for the two cities should be of interest for policymakers. Why did
this occur? It may be due to factors that have nothing to do with training—for example, the
stronger economy in Wuhan may explain the more positive outcomes for employment in that
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city. However, the different results may well be due to differences in the retraining offered in the
two cities. The quality and the relevance of the training programs being offered probably
contributed to the different outcomes. Training that is more responsive to market conditions and
equips workers for jobs that are being created has a greater likelihood of having a positive
impact. Compared to Shenyang, Wuhan’s training programs had certain features that have been
associated with positive training outcomes in international evaluations. These include longer
programs with more practical content and stronger supporting employment services (as indicated
by the much higher proportion of workers going through Reemployment Service Centers).
This evaluation, in combination with the international literature, therefore suggests the
following lessons for retraining policy. First, moderate expectations are in order about the
capacity of retraining programs to reintegrate laid-off workers back into the labor market.
Second, diversification of the sources of training appears fruitful; public, nonprofit, and
commercial providers may have comparative advantages in providing different types of training.
Third, the focus should be on providing training that is responsive to labor demand. The best
way of doing this is to involve employers in planning training. Fourth, the most important
supporting services are job search, counseling, and good labor market information. These not
only can increase the returns to training but they tend to be the most cost efficient of all active
labor market programs. For some workers, particularly those who are job-ready, these
employment services should be the priority. Fifth, programs should be carefully targeted to
groups that are most likely to have a net positive benefit. Lastly, it seems fruitful to experiment
with different financing schemes, including those that require some financial contribution from
trainees.
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These results should be compared to findings from future evaluations. The experience of
other countries with long experience in labor adjustment programs can help inform Chinese
training strategies. But national characteristics do matter a lot. Program evaluation should
become an intrinsic part of the active labor market strategy in China. Such evaluations need to be
carried out in a range of municipalities with varying characteristics and on diverse program
designs. They must also take into account the costs of programs, something that has not been
analyzed in this study. Only through such rigorous evaluations can policymakers determine what
works and for whom in supporting laid-off workers. In addition, it is important to compare
training to other active labor market alternatives (such as employment services) and to highlight
the costs and benefits of alternate interventions to support laid-off workers. It would also be
useful to complement the quantitative survey information with qualitative information on the
quality and relevance of training programs from trainees, training institutes, and employers. This
would enrich the understanding of which training programs work and why.
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APPENDIX:  Sample Means for Participant and Comparison Groups
Table A1   Sample Means for Participant and Comparison Groups
Variable    
Employment regression Earnings regression
Shenyang Wuhan Shenyang Wuhan
Partic. Comp.Diff.(%) Partic. Comp.Diff.(%) Partic. Comp.Diff.(%) Partic. Comp.Diff.(%)
Employed 0.457 0.560 -18.4 0.447 0.410 9.2
Earnings 6.059 6.120 -1.0 6.135 6.248 -1.8
Age 36.76 40.05 -8.2 36.98 38.28 -3.4 36.16 40.08 -9.8 36.74 37.80 -2.8
Age squared 1,406.51 1,646.18 -14.6 1,402.69 1,508.40 -7.0 1,360.06 1,646.99 -17.4 1,387.25 1,467.57 -5.5
Female 0.780 0.473 65.0 0.620 0.422 46.8 0.715 0.378 88.9 0.505 0.338 49.5
Disabled 0.048 0.051 -6.8 0.043 0.045 -4.3 0.047 0.027 77.1 0.038 0.023 60.4
Married 0.834 0.888 -6.0 0.855 0.867 -1.5 0.809 0.901 -10.2 0.833 0.866 -3.9
Time since becoming xiag. 4.465 4.815 -7.3 5.741 5.057 13.5 4.341 4.767 -8.9 5.374 5.215 3.0
Ever visited empl. center 0.387 0.138 179.3 0.440 0.291 50.9 0.395 0.139 184.3 0.372 0.207 79.4
Primary education 0.015 0.015 -1.1 0.005 0.016 -71.3 0.017 0.013 30.5 0.003 0.013 -74.5
Junior education 0.443 0.662 -33.1 0.342 0.347 -1.6 0.432 0.673 -35.8 0.338 0.311 8.6
Senior education 0.272 0.160 70.3 0.455 0.421 8.1 0.270 0.135 100.4 0.433 0.425 2.0
Vocational education 0.125 0.098 27.3 0.135 0.123 9.4 0.114 0.106 7.2 0.140 0.134 4.6
Tertiary education 0.145 0.065 123.4 0.064 0.093 -30.7 0.166 0.072 130.1 0.085 0.117 -27.1
Industry, low-skilled 0.100 0.036 175.6 0.150 0.134 11.7 0.104 0.044 138.3 0.212 0.140 50.6
Industry, manufacturing 0.766 0.942 -18.7 0.758 0.808 -6.2 0.774 0.939 -17.6 0.703 0.799 -12.0
Industry, services 0.083 0.015 455.1 0.069 0.038 79.5 0.065 0.011 465.6 0.078 0.040 95.6
Industry, pub. adm./education 0.049 0.006 663.0 0.023 0.019 19.6 0.057 0.006 900.7 0.007 0.020 -66.0
Occupation, manager 0.044 0.043 3.8 0.046 0.056 -18.0 0.045 0.051 -13.0 0.075 0.087 -13.7
Occupation, professional 0.062 0.035 77.4 0.031 0.027 12.6 0.055 0.034 59.5 0.031 0.030 2.0
Occupation, technician 0.132 0.095 38.8 0.096 0.136 -29.1 0.149 0.089 66.6 0.075 0.171 -56.0
Occupation, clerk 0.124 0.076 63.4 0.138 0.117 18.0 0.132 0.070 87.0 0.123 0.120 2.0
Occupation, service worker 0.088 0.042 112.9 0.067 0.051 31.6 0.077 0.046 68.6 0.078 0.033 134.7
Occupation, agric./fishery 0.000 0.000 0.0 0.003 0.008 -61.7 0.000 0.000 0.0 0.000 0.007 NA
Occupation, craft worker 0.185 0.263 -29.7 0.165 0.200 -17.3 0.164 0.241 -32.2 0.171 0.197 -13.5
Occupation, machine op. 0.278 0.337 -17.5 0.395 0.333 18.7 0.278 0.356 -21.8 0.389 0.304 27.8
Occupation, unskilled labor 0.087 0.111 -21.2 0.058 0.072 -19.2 0.102 0.112 -9.3 0.058 0.050 15.7
Tenure in xiagang ent. (mos.) 134.47 165.62 -18.8 140.48 156.22 -10.1 129.37 166.57 -22.3 138.25 150.99 -8.4
Usual earnings, xiagang ent. 297.99 306.64 -2.8 263.04 283.94 -7.4 300.56 319.93 -6.1 274.47 287.79 -4.6
Firmtype, state enterprise 0.680 0.881 -22.8 0.876 0.966 -9.4 0.702 0.873 -19.5 0.870 0.953 -8.7
Firmtype, collective ent. 0.262 0.112 134.2 0.116 0.032 263.7 0.243 0.120 103.0 0.119 0.043 174.7
Firmtype, private enterprise 0.024 0.003 645.2 0.003 0.000 NA 0.022 0.002 1,074.7 0.003 0.000 NA
Firmtype, joint venture 0.024 0.002 1,017.9 0.003 0.002 91.4 0.022 0.002 1,074.7 0.003 0.003 2.0
Firmtype, other 0.010 0.002 379.1 0.002 0.000 NA 0.010 0.004 161.0 0.003 0.000 NA
Benefits,  medical 0.380 0.446 -14.9 0.646 0.707 -8.6 0.397 0.473 -16.1 0.648 0.716 -9.4
Benefits, pension 0.398 0.423 -5.9 0.619 0.624 -0.9 0.434 0.449 -3.2 0.618 0.625 -1.2
Receives unemp. benefits 0.057 0.010 491.5 0.089 0.034 164.3 0.065 0.004 1,596.8 0.055 0.030 81.4
Working in July 1998 0.365 0.557 -34.5 0.369 0.381 -3.1 0.638 0.856 -25.5 0.580 0.676 -14.1
House owned by individual 0.287 0.296 -3.1 0.175 0.186 -5.9 0.293 0.319 -8.3 0.160 0.154 4.3
House owned by enterprise 0.102 0.163 -37.4 0.168 0.277 -39.1 0.089 0.184 -51.6 0.195 0.274 -29.1
House owned by parents 0.523 0.444 17.7 0.418 0.357 17.2 0.536 0.422 27.0 0.420 0.391 7.3
House owned by other 0.088 0.097 -8.7 0.239 0.181 32.1 0.082 0.074 10.4 0.225 0.181 24.7
Household size 3.201 3.184 0.5 3.351 3.286 2.0 3.199 3.169 0.9 3.352 3.314 1.1
Number of employed in HH 0.703 0.536 31.2 0.495 0.486 1.7 0.762 0.517 47.3 0.495 0.458 8.0
Children age 6 or older 0.652 0.855 -23.8 0.732 0.736 -0.5 0.648 0.884 -26.7 0.710 0.753 -5.7
Children below age 6 0.102 0.043 139.5 0.098 0.094 3.8 0.092 0.044 110.0 0.113 0.097 16.1
Number of observations 882 939 653 625 403 526 293 299
